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POT AS PRETEXT: MARIJUANA, RACE AND THE NEW DISORDER
IN NEW YORK CITY STREET POLICING
Amanda Geller and Jeffrey Fagan
ABSTRACT
Although possession of small quantities of marijuana has been
decriminalized in New York State since the late 1970s, arrests for
marijuana possession in New York City have increased more than
tenfold since the mid-1990s, and remain high more than ten years later.
This rise has been a notable component of the City’s “Order
Maintenance Policing” strategy, designed to aggressively target lowlevel offenses, usually through street interdictions known as “Stop,
Question, and Frisk” activity. We analyze data on 2.2 million stops and
arrests carried out from 2004 to 2008, and identify significant racial
disparities in the implementation of marijuana enforcement. These
disparities, present in both stops and arrests, are robust to controls for
social structure, local crime conditions, and stop levels more broadly.
The racial imbalance in marijuana enforcement in black neighborhoods
suggest a “doubling down” of street-level policing in places already
subject to heightened scrutiny in the search for weapons, a link which
suggests that the policing of marijuana may be a pretext in the search for
guns. Despite these ties, however, we show no significant relationship
between marijuana enforcement activity and the likelihood of seizing
firearms or other weapons. We also show that a large proportion of
marijuana enforcement lacks constitutional justification under either
federal or New York law.
Marijuana stops are more prevalent in
precincts where “other” and “high-crime area” justifications are more
likely to be reported, two factors that are constitutionally insufficient to
justify a street stop. The racial skew, questionable constitutionality, and
limited efficiency of marijuana enforcement in detecting serious crimes
suggest that non-white New Yorkers bear a racial tax from contemporary
policing strategy, a social cost not offset by any substantial observed
benefits to public safety.
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POT AS PRETEXT: MARIJUANA, RACE AND THE NEW DISORDER
*
IN NEW YORK CITY STREET POLICING
Amanda Geller and Jeffrey Fagan

I. INTRODUCTION
Police enforcement of marijuana offenses in New York City has grown dramatically
over the past half century, and has intensified in recent years. Marijuana arrests have nearly
doubled since the mid-1990s despite the decriminalization of marijuana possession (in small
quantities) in 1977 by the New York State Legislature (Golub and Johnson, 2006, 2007;
Levine and Small, 2008). This new focus on marijuana was one of the key components of
then-Mayor Giuliani’s strategy of Order Maintenance Policing (OMP) in New York City
(Livingston, 1997; Spitzer, 1999; Harcourt, 2001; Golub, Johnson, and Dunlap 2007;
Harcourt and Ludwig, 2007). As part of OMP, police began targeting individuals
“possessing, selling, or smoking even small amounts of marijuana” as part of their efforts to
intensively enforce “quality of life” crimes and other minor misdemeanors (Flynn, 1998).
The central tactic in this search for marijuana was the use of aggressive “stop, question, and
frisk” (SQF) tactics to identify would-be offenders (Harcourt, 2001; Waldeck, 2000; Fagan
and Davies, 2000; Levine and Small, 2008).

*

Amanda Geller is an Associate Research Scientist in the Schools of Social Work and Law at Columbia
University. Jeffrey Fagan is Professor of Law and Public Health and Director of the Center for Crime,
Community and Law at Columbia Law School. The authors are grateful to the New York Civil Liberties Union
for pursuing the litigation that resulted in public disclosure of data on stops and frisks conducted by the New
York City Police Department. The New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services generously provided
detailed data on crime- and race-specific arrests in New York City. Thanks to James Quinn for his heroic
efforts to geocode unruly data on stop locations. Stephen H. Clarke provided truly outstanding research
assistance. Robert MacCoun and Paul Heaton provided valuable feedback on earlier versions of this paper, as
did seminar participants at the Columbia University School of Social Work and an anonymous reviewer.
Support for this research was provided in part by the City Council of the City of New York, and by Columbia
Law School. All opinions, conclusions or errors are those of the authors alone.
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Figure 1 shows that marijuana possession arrests skyrocketed with the advent of
“quality of life” enforcement in 1994. By 2000, marijuana arrests accounted for fifteen
percent of all adult arrests in the city, more than any nondrug misdemeanor charge (Levine
and Small 2008, Golub et al 2007). By 2006, rates were nearly 500% greater than a decade
earlier. In fact, New York City’s four largest boroughs rank in the top five U.S. counties in
per capita marijuana arrest rates (King and Mauer, 2006; Levine and Small, 2008).
[Figure 1 about here]
The bulk of marijuana possession enforcement in New York City has fallen on the
city’s black and Hispanic residents (cf., Dwyer, 2009), a skew at odds with the racial and
ethnic patterns of marijuana use in observed in local and national survey data. The
Monitoring the Future Survey, an annual survey of substance use among high school seniors
and eighth graders, shows that teenage marijuana use since 1990 is higher among whites than
other racial or ethnic groups (Johnston et al. 2005). In a study of 43 urban and suburban
neighborhoods, Saxe et al (2001) shows that blacks and Hispanics reported lower rates of
drug use than their white counterparts. The National Survey of Drug Use and Health
(NSDUH) showed very small differences in marijuana use rates between black and white
teenagers, and lower rates among Hispanics. Yet marijuana arrest rates across the U.S. have
been far higher for non-Hispanic Blacks and Hispanics (King and Mauer, 2006). In New
York City, ground zero for marijuana enforcement nationally (King and Maurer, 2006;
Levine and Small, 2008), youth are less like to report having used marijuana than their
counterparts nationwide, and white youth are more likely to have tried illegal substances
(including marijuana as well as other drugs) than blacks or Hispanics (NYC Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene, 2007).
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The racial disparity in marijuana arrests may be explained by the availability of
marijuana smokers and sellers in minority communities. Saxe et al. (2001) notes that since
visible drug sales are more prevalent in minority neighborhoods, police can simply choose
efficiency over distributive concerns by focusing on the “low hanging fruit” of visible
marijuana use.

But that choice has produced large racial disparities in misdemeanor

marijuana arrest rates relative to race-specific rates of marijuana possession or use, and only
tells part of the story of enforcement patterns in New York City.
Operationally, the majority of marijuana arrests in New York City stem from “stop,
question, and frisk” activity (SQF), the tactical engine of OMP (Levine and Small, 2008).
Street stops are conducted predominantly in poor neighborhoods with high concentrations of
black and Hispanic residents, at levels that exceed even what local disorder and crime
conditions would predict (Spitzer, 1999; Fagan and Davies, 2000; Gelman, Fagan and Kiss,
2007; Fagan et al., 2010), and marijuana arrests are clustered in many of the same
neighborhoods where SQF is carried out with the highest intensity (Harcourt and Ludwig,
2007; Levine and Small, 2008).
In this paper we examine the role that marijuana enforcement plays in the broader
tactical landscape of OMP, with several tests of the links between SQF activity and
marijuana enforcement. We identify racial disparities in marijuana stop and arrest patterns at
both the individual and precinct levels. We also test whether any observed concentration of
marijuana enforcement in minority precincts is driven by crime patterns or enforcement
patterns more broadly, and how the police pursuit of marijuana ties into the primary goal of
OMP, the pursuit of weapons. Next, we use the stated rationales recorded for each stop to
examine the documented circumstances of these marijuana stops, in order to assess the
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constitutional legality of this police behavior. Finally, we assess the efficiency of marijuana
stops in detecting both marijuana possession and other illegal activities. To the extent that
marijuana enforcement is grounded in OMP principles and practices, it raises the same
constitutional and public safety concerns. These concerns are the focus of this analysis.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND CRIMINOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
A. Doubling Down on Pot: A Brief History of Order Maintenance Policing
Following the election of Rudolph Giuliani as Mayor in 1993, newly appointed
NYPD Commissioner William Bratton implemented a regime he called Order Maintenance
Policing (OMP), which – together with other management reforms and innovations such as
CompStat1 crime mapping and accounting – dramatically and suddenly changed both the
strategy and tactics of policing across the City (Bratton and Knobler, 1998; Silverman, 1999).
The new strategy was grounded in Broken Windows theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982;
Kelling and Coles, 1996) and focused on the connection between physical and social disorder
and violent crime (Greene, 1999; Livingston, 1997; Spitzer, 1999; Sampson and
Raudenbush, 1999; Duneier and Molotch, 1999; Waldeck, 2000; Fagan and Davies, 2000;
Taylor, 2001; Harcourt, 2001; Garnett, 2005; Fagan et al., 2010).
The Broken Windows theory suggested that the police “take care of the little things”,
such as physical and social disorder, to prevent the onset of more serious crime (Wilson and
Kelling, 1982). The chief architect of the OMP strategy, Jack Maple, suggested that these
1

CompStat combines real-time (or nearly real-time) crime accounting with strategic analysis. CompStat
generates data for systematic analysis of location-specific crime trends and problems, allocation of police
resources to respond to those trends, and identification of performance measures for individual officers and their
commanders based on responses of crime trends to their data. CompStat meetings, where the performance of
local commanders is reviewed regularly and publicly, provide a dramatic forum where institutional norms of
accountability are efficiently communicated through direct language and action such as police administrators to
either reward or punish, sometimes with public shaming or humiliation, performance as measured against
quantitative indicia based on crime analysis (see, also, Silverman, 1999; Bratton and Knoebler, 1998; Weisburd,
Mastrofski, Greenspan and Willis, 2004).
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“little things” be taken care of through the aggressive interdiction of individuals engaged in
disorderly activity, reasoning that disorderly individuals were likely to be carrying weapons
or other contraband, or be on their way to or from robberies or other violent crimes (Maple
and Mitchell, 1999).

To stop them, police were to preemptively and aggressively engage

them, and if necessary, frisk and search them for weapons and contraband (Kelling and
Coles, 1996; Bratton and Knobler, 1998; Silverman, 1999; Maple and Mitchell, 1999).
These aggressive “stop, question, and frisk” (SQF) tactics were designed to reduce violence
and weapons (especially firearms) possession (Spitzer, 1999; Waldeck, 2000; Fagan and
Davies, 2000; Harcourt, 2001).
Accordingly, Police Strategy No. 5, Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York,
articulated a reconstructed version of Broken Windows theory as the driving force in the
development of policing policy. It stated that the NYPD would apply its enforcement efforts
to “reclaim the streets” by systematically and aggressively enforcing laws against low-level
social disorder: graffiti, aggressive panhandling, fare beating, public drunkenness, unlicensed
vending, public drinking, public urination, and other low-level misdemeanor offenses.
Applying Maple’s ideas, the strategy of targeting low-level offenders was thought to leverage
the prevention of more serious crime as well, because individuals stopped for minor offenses
might also be carrying weapons, or have outstanding warrants for more serious crimes
(Kelling and Coles 1996). While the shift to marijuana was not explicitly stated in any of the
policy memoranda or public pronouncements that launched OMP, marijuana and serious
crime have been linked rhetorically, if not scientifically, since the early 20th century (Bonnie
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and Whitebread, 1970). As OMP implementation progressed in New York City, marijuana
possession quickly became a targeted offense2.

B. Race, Crime and Order Maintenance Policing
The role of race in OMP has been highly contested. Critics of OMP point out not
only the disproportionate stop levels faced by minority citizens and neighborhoods, but
significant racial differences in post-stop outcomes (cf., Dwyer, 2009). Although the OMP
strategy was designed as a place-based intervention, targeting areas characterized by disorder
and high crime levels, the burden of its implementation has predominantly been felt by the
City’s minority residents and communities (Spitzer, 1999; Kocieniewski, 1999; Roane, 1999;
Jackson, 2000; Fagan and Davies, 2000). In a 15 month period from January 1998 through
March 1999, Non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic Black, and Hispanic White New Yorkers were
three times more likely than their white counterparts to be stopped and frisked on suspicion
of weapons or violent crimes relative to each group’s participation in each of those two types
of crimes (Gelman, et al., 2007).

Moreover, OMP was concentrated in predominantly

minority neighborhoods at rates that far exceeded what local levels of crime and disorder
would predict (id; Fagan et al., 2010).

2

The origins of the formal connection between OMP and marijuana enforcement may lie in Operation Condor,
one of the core crime control initiatives that drove the increase in marijuana arrests since the mid-1990s. Condor
was a Giuliani administration initiative that began in 1999 as an aggressive narcotics enforcement program
targeting low-level drug transactions, and later expanding to include quality-of-life violations. Condor flooded
high-crime areas with additional officers and, at its peak, cost more than $100 million a year in overtime costs,
bringing officers in to work additional shifts on their days off to pursue drug crimes, especially marijuana
(Rashbaum, 2003). Condor officers were involved in the killing of Patrick Dorismond, who struggled with
police officers after refusing their efforts to entice him to buy marijuana in a reverse sting (Flynn, 2000). At its
peak, Condor was credited with placing an additional 1,000 officers per day on patrol (Rashbaum, 2002).
Condor was criticized by detectives and police union officials for its aggressive tactics, such as suspicionless
searches and targeting minority youths (Flynn, 2000) and was, after 2004, replaced by Operation Impact, which
targeted specific neighborhoods that were identified through both CompStat analysis and local intelligence, with
rookie police officers. One precinct commander referred to it as “pinpoint precision bombing” (Dawan, 2003).
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Street stop outcomes also suggest racial disparities: particularly in the late 1990s,
stops of black citizens had significantly lower hit rates than those of whites, and these
disparities persist at the neighborhood level, suggesting that residents of black neighborhoods
are subject to a lower threshold of suspicion than their white counterparts (id.). Post-stop
outcomes differ by race in other ways as well: blacks and Hispanics are more likely to be
searched or frisked than whites, and more likely to be subjected to physical force (Ridgeway,
2007).
Proponents of SQF practices point out that ethnic minorities are more likely to be
victims of crime than their white counterparts, and that crime rates are higher in minority
neighborhoods (Bratton and Knobler, 1998; Smith and Purtell, 2008). They justify excess
stops of black citizens by claiming that the racial distribution of stops reflects the racial
distribution of crime suspects (Ridgeway, 2007; MacDonald, 2009). However, only about 20
percent of all stops are based on a specific suspect description, leaving this justification
irrelevant to the remaining 80 percent (Spitzer, 1999; Fagan et al., 2010). Proponents also
claim that racial disparities in stop practices are grounded in the targeting of high-crime
areas, rather than resulting from explicit racial targeting. In this account, the fact that those
areas are populated by black New Yorkers is incidental to the pattern of stops.
The empirical support most often cited by proponents of OMP is the drastic reduction
in New York City crime rates throughout the 1990s, which they credit to SQF practices
(Smith and Purtell 2008; MacDonald, 2009).

However, the effectiveness of OMP in

preventing or interdicting crime is also a topic of contentious debate. The yield of firearms
and other weapons seized, perhaps the primary rationale for aggressive stops under OMP
(Bratton and Knobler, 1998; Spitzer, 1999; Maple and Mitchell, 1999), is low. In 2003, a
total of 633 firearms were seized pursuant to stops, a rate of 3.9 seizures per 1,000 stops. By
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2006, following a 300% increase in the number of stops, the seizure rate fell to 1.4 per 1,000
stops (Fagan et al., 2010). The rate of arrests pursuant to street stops also declined with
rising stop rates, from 15.4% in approximately 125,000 street stops in 1998 (Spitzer, 1999;
Gelman et al., 2007) to less than five percent in about 500,000 stops in 2006 (Fagan et al.,
2006). Proponents of SQF suggest that these low “hit rates” reflect the success of OMP in
mounting a deterrent threat, leading to the withdrawal of would-be offenders from crime.
However, significant crime declines in many other large cities suggest that larger secular
processes may be equally influential in the ongoing crime decline, rather than city-specific
processes (cf., Ludwig and Harcourt, 2006; Rosenfeld et al., 2005).

C. Constitutional Regulation
Just as OMP, which was based on theories of social and physical disorder
(Livingston, 1997; Harcourt, 1998; Waldeck, 1999; Fagan and Davies, 2000),3 gave rise to
Equal Protection concerns because of its racial and spatial concentration, marijuana
enforcement runs similar risks based on its shared policy and tactical foundations. Likewise,
since stops under OMP have raised Fourth Amendment concerns (Spitzer, 1999; Gould and
Mastrofski, 2004; Harcourt and Meares, 2010), it is reasonable to extend those concerns to
the legal justifications of marijuana enforcement. The potential for legal ambiguity is greatest
in “high discretion – low suspicion” stops (Spitzer, 1999; Harcourt, 2001), and it is clear
from the New York State statute that marijuana enforcement may fall into this category.
New York Penal Law § 221, detailed in part in Appendix A, distinguishes between “unlawful
possession of marijuana”, which is a violation not punishable by arrest, from “plain view”

3

At its implementation in 1994, OMP also was based on concerted efforts to reduce violence and specifically,
to detect and remove illegal weapons. See, Spitzer (1999), and Fagan et al. (2010). See, also, Bratton and
Knobler (1998) and Silverman (1999).
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marijuana offenses, and each of these from higher grades of simple possession, which
typically require observation or an act of purchase as the justifying suspicion.
The legal standard in New York that regulates the constitutionality of police
conduct in citizen stops was set forth in People v. De Bour (1976), which expands on the
Terry v. Ohio (1968) standard in federal caselaw. While Terry assumes that police-civilian
encounters, even suspicionless ones, are consensual and could be terminated by the suspect,
De Bour forbids inquiries “based on mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity” (Carlis, 2009).
Whether the suspicion of marijuana possession is sufficient to prompt a stop, and on which
charge, is frequently a matter of officer discretion (Levine and Small, 2008). In New York,
the Court of Appeals set forth a four-tiered scheme in which invasive police actions, ranging
from accusatory questions to frisks and searches, must be justified by progressively elevated
levels of suspicion (See Appendix B).
The elasticity of the rules established by Terry and De Bour and the soft boundaries
set forth in subsequent cases created a wide space of discretion in which police craft could be
justified to stop and frisk citizens at low levels of suspicion4. The 1999 investigation of the
NYPD’s SQF tactics by the New York State Attorney General’s office demonstrated the
limited constitutionality of police stops under OMP tactics (Spitzer 1999). Based on a
review by a team of lawyers and social scientists of a sample of 5,000 textual narratives
4

Both State and Federal courts have expanded the concept of` “reasonable suspicion” to include location as
well as individual behavior. This opens the door to stops where suspicion is conditioned on the place where it is
observed. The Supreme Court has articulated and refined this “high crime area” doctrine, in cases from Adams
v Williams (1972) to Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) (Ferguson and Bernache, 2008). This line of cases allows
police to consider the character of a neighborhood as a factor that may elevate the suspicion generated by a
given action, reducing the individualized factors required to justify a stop. In Wardlow, the Supreme Court
noted that although an individual’s presence in a “high crime area” does not meet the standard for a
particularized suspicion of criminal activity, a location's characteristics are relevant to determining whether a
behavior is sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation. Though Wardlow has not been fully
embraced by the New York Court of Appeals, presence in a high crime area is one factor that has been shown to
elevate suspicion and justify police intervention (Kamins, 2009). The resulting expansion of police authority to
justify stop and search activities conflates “high crime areas” with neighborhood racial makeup, placing
minority neighborhoods and citizens at increased risk of more frequent police contact.
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stating the rationale for police stops and frisks over a 15-month period beginning in January
1998, the Spitzer report estimated that approximately 15% of all street stops were unjustified
under Fourth Amendment law in effect at that time,5 and the constitutionality of more than
one in three other stops (35.5%) was inconclusive.

Civilians have also registered

constitutional concerns about street stop activities; complaints to the Civilian Complaint
Review Board increased 66% between 2002 and 2006, an increase concurrent with the rise in
street stop activity (Clarke, 2009). The substantiation rate of complaints related to frisks and
searches more than doubled between 2002 and 2004, a period in which complaints related to
other forms of improper police behavior saw little change in their substantiation rate (ibid.)

D. This Study
The intersection of racial disparities and constitutional irregularities in police stops
were the basis for litigation (Daniels et al v City of New York, 2003) that led to a Consent
Decree regulating the conduct of street stops and prohibiting the use of race as a factor in the
selection of citizens for stops and subsequent intrusions.

The potential for similar

irregularities in marijuana enforcement is a natural consequence and risk of OMP, but the
extent to which these concerns apply is unknown.
Accordingly, in this analysis we test four hypotheses. First, the similarity in the
patterns of street stops and marijuana arrests under OMP have led to characterizations of

5

After the publication of that report, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Illinois v. Wardlow (holding that an
individual who suddenly and without provocation flees from identifiable police officers patrolling a high crime
area creates reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment for the police to stop him). In practice, the “high
crime area” doctrine permits police officers to take location into account when determining whether they have
sufficient justification to stop and question a suspect. Although being present in a high crime area alone is not
sufficient to justify a stop, this factor in combination with other similarly insufficient factors to justify
reasonable suspicion can combine to form reasonable suspicion. See, Ferguson and Bernache (2008). One
impact of Wardlow would be the likely reduction in the estimate in Spitzer (1999) of the number of
constitutionally unjustified stops.
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marijuana as the new Broken Windows, a manifestation of underlying crime and disorder
problems that justifies aggressive policing in minority neighborhoods (King and Mauer,
2006; Harcourt and Ludwig, 2007; Levine and Small, 2008). If this is indeed the case, the
prevalence of street stops for marijuana, and marijuana enforcement more broadly, should be
greatest in the City’s minority neighborhoods, the places where OMP activity is most heavily
concentrated, and where crime rates are higher. But if these stops represent excess
enforcement, then their prevalence should be predicted not only by overall stop activity or by
various indicia of crime, but also by neighborhood demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics, especially race.
Second, if the police focus on marijuana is an attempt to link marijuana enforcement
to “quality of life” crimes, based on the Broken Windows theory that serious crime will fall as
a result, then we would expect marijuana stops to be most prevalent in areas with an
immediate history of violent crime and high levels of disorder complaints. If, on the other
hand, marijuana enforcement is being used as a pretext to pursue a search for weapons, then
we would expect to see more intense marijuana enforcement in areas where weapons are also
heavily pursued.
Third, given the Fourth Amendment concerns raised about OMP more broadly, we
examine the legal justifications provided for marijuana street stops, and test whether the
stated rationales comply with the “reasonable suspicion” required for Terry (street) stops.
We estimate the extent to which these justifications explain observed patterns of stop
activity, anticipating, for example, that precincts where a large percentage of stop activity is
justified by suspicion of a drug transaction would also have high levels of marijuana stops,
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and that the narratives of suspicion would explain a large portion of the variation in stop
activity.
Finally, we examine whether marijuana stops contribute to broader public safety
goals. If, as internal police strategy memoranda state, the strict enforcement of minor
offenses such as misdemeanor marijuana possession has positive spillover effects and
prevents more serious crime, then stopping individuals on suspicion of marijuana possession
might lead to the detection of weapons and other illegal activity as well. We test the extent
to which this is the case.

III. METHODS
A. Data
1. Stop Activity
Our analysis is based on a unique and detailed dataset from the New York City Police
Department, made publicly available following a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
request and subsequent court order (New York Civil Liberties Union, 2008). The NYPD
records information on a form known as the UF-250 each time a citizen is stopped by the
police, according to procedures set forth in the NYPD Patrol Guide (2009). A copy of the
UF-250 is in Appendix C. These records have been maintained in a digital database since
1998, when the state Attorney General began his investigation of the department’s Stop and
Frisk tactics (Spitzer, 1999), and were updated following the litigation of Daniels v City of
New York (2003). In this analysis, we use data from 2004-8.
The UF-250 form requires officers to record information regarding the suspect’s
demographic and physical characteristics, the location and time of day of the stop, the
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suspect’s address, and information about the officer who made the stop and the supervisor
who reviewed it. The form contains a free-response section where officers indicate the
suspected offense that generated the stop. We identify those where the suspected crime was
suspicion of marijuana possession.
While officers may use any number of phrases to describe stops based on suspicion of
marijuana possession, we use a few key and recurring terms to identify these “marijuana
stops”.6 We use similar procedures to identify stops for suspicion of carrying a concealed
weapon (“CPW”), a primary focus of OMP policing (Spitzer, 1999; Fagan et al., 2010), and
other suspected crimes, including “index crimes”7, other felonies and misdemeanors and nonfingerprintable offenses.
The UF-250 data matches each stop to its police precinct location, even if the stop
was made by an officer in a command with cross-precinct patrol assignments.8 We aggregate
the records of stops conducted from 2004-8 into a precinct-year panel, separately identifying
total stops, stops for marijuana, and stops for possession of a weapon, and disaggregating
stops by suspect race or ethnicity. The total sample was approximately 2.2 million stops.

2. Stop Legality
6

Stops are identified as marijuana stops from the “crimsusp” (i.e., “crime suspected”) field. A 30-character
string, crimsusp is entered by the officers at the time of a stop, and can take on virtually any value, including
typographical errors. The most common designation identifying the criminal possession of marijuana, “CPM”,
identifies 30,759 of the marijuana stops identified. At the other end of the spectrum, 1,328 marijuana stops are
identified from “crime suspected” values that appear only once, such as “CPM MISD PSA#0243” or
“POSSESSION OF MARJUINA”. A complete list of the 1,738 crimsusp values used to identify marijuana
stops is available from the authors upon request.
7
Index offenses, collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, include murder and non-negligent
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.
8
New York City police precincts are numbered non-consecutively from 1 to 123. Cross-precinct assignments
refer to those such as those in public housing. For example, enforcement in public housing is assigned a housing
bureau, which in turn in organized into eight Police Service Areas (PSA’s). Officers in each PSA areas may
work in a catchment area including several public housing developments span precinct boundaries. Special anticrime units similarly work across precinct boundaries. In addition, we drop 1,276 stops from the analysis
because they were not reported with a valid precinct.
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The NYPD responded to the Attorney General’s investigation and the subsequent
Daniels litigation by modifying the UF-250 to limit the information that officers could use to
justify a street stop (Flynn, 2001).

Whereas officers previously recorded their stop

justification in a narrative form, beginning in 2001 they were required to check one or more
of 10 boxes that indicate the legal basis for the suspicion that led to the stop. The indicia of
suspicion listed on the form reflect the legal framework established by both Terry v. Ohio
(1968) and People v. De Bour (1976).
The UF-250 also includes 10 categories of “additional circumstances” that may
condition the initial basis for the stop in instances where the separate indicia of suspicion are
constitutionally insufficient to comply with constitutional standards. For example, while a
person’s “furtive movements” or “turning at the sight of an officer” may be insufficient alone
to justify a stop, Illinois v Wardlow (2000) grants that if these factors are present in a “high
crime area,” the stop may pass constitutional scrutiny under Federal law. Appendix D lists
the factors that are available to officers to justify a stop, and the “additional circumstances”
that they also can record to modify the stop factors. For both the stop factors and additional
circumstances, officers can check a box marked “Other” if the basis for the stop does not fit
into the available categories. Should a stop proceed to a frisk or a search, the revised UF-250
form also includes checkboxes for the rationales to justify these post-stop actions.9 The UF-

9

As envisioned by DeBour, stops, frisks and searches are governed by N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50(1)
(2007). However, “stops” and “frisks” are considered separately under New York statutes. A police officer may
stop a suspect but not to frisk the suspect given the circumstances. Frisks and searches are governed by N.Y.
Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50(3), which requires a legitimate “stop” as a predicate to any frisk. In many cases,
reasonable suspicion that a person is engaging in violent or dangerous crime (such as murder, burglary, assault,
etc.) will justify both a stop and a frisk. A reasonable belief that the suspect has a weapon or that the officer is
in danger of physical injury can also justify a frisk. A search is permissible as a Level 4 DeBour stop, where
there is probable cause that a crime has occurred and a search can be conducted either separately from or
incident to an arrest. As with the initial stop, these factors alone may or may not justify the further intervention,
but when combined with these additional circumstances, the actions may pass constitutional scrutiny as Level 3
and Level 4 DeBour stops. In each of these levels of police intrusion, the presence of one of the “additional
circumstances” can create constitutionally valid justification for a frisk or search if other marginal factors are
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250 database can thus be used to link officers’ assessments of the indicia of suspicion to the
characteristics of a suspect, the suspected crime, the location of the stop, and its outcome.
The UF-250s also allow a distinction between stops made in response to a previously
reported crime or emergency (commonly referred to as “radio runs”), and stops initiated
based on observed suspicious conduct, not previously reported. For example, an officer may,
based on a radio run, stop a suspect because they fit the description provided by a witness
during a 911 call. However the data show that radio runs account for only 20 percent of the
stops made between 2004 and 2008, and an even smaller portion (13%) of marijuana stops.
Most stops were, instead, initiated by police officers, and require “reasonable and
articulable” suspicion under Terry and De Bour.

3. Post-Stop Outcomes
In addition providing officers an opportunity to mark whether a frisk or search was
done, the UF-250 also includes boxes where officers can mark whether an arrest was made,
contraband was seized, and if a firearm was confiscated, the type of firearm. The UF-250
includes places to mark down whether force was used, and if so, the type of force. Force
categories range from the use of hands to drawing a weapon.

4. Precinct Socioeconomic Conditions
Precinct-level demographic data are drawn from 2006 projections of U.S. Census
data, (see ESRI, 2006 for details.) Projections of total population, race, ethnic, and age
breakdowns, and unemployment, are made at the tract level, and aggregated from tracts to
police precincts. Because precincts do not, as a rule, share boundaries with census tracts, we
present that alone would be insufficient to justify the further action.
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allocate tract populations to precincts based on the percent of each tract’s area that falls into
each precinct.10
Data on poverty and the concentration of foreign-born population are observed at the
Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) level from the 2005-2007 American Community
Survey. This survey is conducted annually by the Census Bureau to develop mid-decade
demographic and economic indicators for cities and counties. Data on physical disorder are
observed at the sub-borough level in the 2005 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey.
These data are then allocated to the precincts that most closely fall within the boundaries of
these larger administrative units.
5. Precinct Crime Conditions
Data on reported crimes by suspect race and precinct were obtained by one of the
authors from the NYPD pursuant to litigation in Floyd et al. v. City of New York (2008), and
data on arrests were obtained from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services
(DCJS). Both the NYPD and DCJS data identify the suspect race (where known) and alleged
offense, though the categories used to classify offenses vary by reporting agency. Because
the NYPD data do not include details on marijuana possession (instead classifying all
controlled substance offenses as “dangerous drugs”), we base our estimates of marijuana
possession arrests on DCJS data.

B. Model Specification

10

For example, if precinct A shares area with three census tracts (A1, A2, and A3), the precinct population is
estimated as:
% of A1 falling into precinct A*population of A1 +
% of A2 falling into precinct A*population of A2 +
% of A3 falling into precinct A*population of A3
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1. Descriptive Analysis
We begin by examining the extent to which the racial disparities observed by Golub
et al (2007) in marijuana possession arrests are also present in marijuana street stops. We
compare the citywide demographic breakdown of stops for marijuana possession to the
breakdown of arrests for marijuana offenses, all arrests, and the city more broadly. We also
use the (X,Y) coordinates provided by the NYPD to geocode more than 75% of documented
stops to the intersections at which they took place (or a greater level of detail), and examine
the extent to which, as posited by Levine and Small (2008), marijuana street stops are
concentrated in areas with high concentrations of black residents.
2. Modeling Approach: Marijuana Stop Prevalence
We next estimate a set of models to test whether any observed racial disparities in
marijuana stop activity can be explained by precinct socioeconomic factors or citywide
trends in policing11. We use Generalized Estimating Equations (GEEs) with a negative
binomial functional form to reflect the discrete nature of stop counts, and a population
exposure variable to reflect the expectation of higher stop counts in more populated areas.
GEE’s are beneficial for nested data (such as years nested within precincts), as they allow the
specification of within-subject correlations of observations (Hardin and Hilbe, 2003;
Ballinger, 2004). We assume an AR(1) covariance of years within precincts to account for
autocorrelation in rates of both the dependent variables and predictors in each precinct.
We begin by examining the extent to which stop counts vary by precinct racial
composition, controlling for year fixed effects to account for citywide changes over time, and

11

The 22nd Precinct (Central Park) is omitted from these models, as it has no relevant demographic or
socioeconomic data.
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borough fixed effects to reflect organizational and social structural commonalities.
Subsequent models use a similar form, with progressively more precinct controls. The
second model adds controls for precinct socioeconomic conditions using the percent of the
population that is foreign-born, and a principal components factor to summarize the level of
socioeconomic disadvantage.12 The third model examines the extent to which marijuana
stops, and their geographic distribution, vary with precinct crime conditions. Specifically,
this model controls for violent crime complaints in the previous year13, anticipating that
police resources might be allocated more heavily to high-crime areas. The fourth model also
includes a control for past-year marijuana arrests, to test whether marijuana enforcement
practices are stable over time14. Finally, our fifth model adds a control for the total number
of stops recorded in the precinct in the year, to account for the fact that marijuana stops are
likely to be more prevalent in areas subject to more stops overall.
Following our models of marijuana stop prevalence, we again examine how stop and
frisk activity fits into the NYPD’s broader strategy of marijuana enforcement. Levine and
Small (2008) posit that the majority of marijuana possession arrests begin as street stops, and
our descriptive analysis examines whether this is the case, and whether the race disparities
seen in arrests are mirrored in stop activity. We also define a measure of overall marijuana
enforcement equal to the total of stops and arrests for marijuana15, and replicate the stop
models to test whether overall enforcement patterns follow the same patterns as marijuana

12

Principal components factor analysis is commonly used to extract common thematic elements from several
highly correlated variables (See, e.g. Sampson and Raudenbush 1999). The socioeconomic disadvantage factor
loads heavily on precinct poverty levels, unemployment rate, and levels of physical disorder, as computed in
Fagan et al. (2010).
13
Crime complaints are measured by thousands, but substantive results are also robust to a control for logged
crime complaints. “Violent crime” complaints refer to homicide, rape, robbery, assault, arson, and kidnapping.
14
Marijuana arrests are measured by thousands, but substantive results are also robust to a control for logged
arrests.
15
Marijuana arrests recorded in the street stop database are subtracted from this total to avoid double-counting.
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stops. In this series, Models 1 through 3 examine levels of enforcement in each precinct and
year, and Models 4 and 5, by controlling for past-year arrests, examine changes in
enforcement patterns. Given that marijuana enforcement rose citywide from 2004-2008,
coefficients in these models identify precincts in which enforcement increased more rapidly.
The next series of models examines how marijuana enforcement fits into the overall
stop and frisk strategy, and the stated goals of order maintenance policing. While OMP cited
the Broken Windows theory that the enforcement of minor crime would reduce more serious
crime as well, SQF emphasized gun detection, and about one stop in five is based on
suspicion of weapons possession. We test the links between marijuana stops and arrests and
each of these goals by building on our marijuana enforcement models, beginning with an
additional control for past-year disorder complaints16. To the extent that marijuana stop
activity ties into a broader policy of order maintenance, we anticipate that measures of prior
disorder would significantly predict precinct stop levels. Next, we add an additional control
for weapons focus, or the percent of stops in each precinct and year on suspicion of weapons
possession. The extent to which marijuana stops are concentrated in precincts that prioritize
weapons possession may raise concerns that marijuana enforcement is used as a pretext for a
street stop in what is a de facto search for weapons.
3. Legality Analysis
We next we analyze the legality of marijuana stops, and their compliance with the
Terry standard of “reasonable suspicion”. The checkoff recording system on the UF-250 is
grounded in case law, though it also gives officers an option to select two types of “other”
16

Disorder complaints include those for: Offenses against public order and sensibility (comprises 99% of
disorder complaints), alcoholic beverage control law, disorderly conduct, disruption of a religious service,
fortune telling, gambling, loitering, loitering for drug purposes, loitering for deviate sex, and loitering for
gambling.
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factors or circumstances that motivated the stop. This checkoff method can generate more
than 300 unique combinations of the constitutionalizing stop factors or justifications alone.
When the additional circumstances options are considered, more than 9,000 unique
combinations of stop factors and additional circumstances are available, plus more
combinations when officers include “other” as a justification17. For the 2.2 million stops, no
single combination appears in more than 15% of stops, making a complete analysis of all
factors listed nearly impossible.
To identify a set of cohesive and interpretable legal dimensions that reflect recurring
patterns among the 9,000 combinations of stop factors and additional circumstances, we
performed a principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation to extract the sets of
individual factors that best capture the distinct and recurring legal narratives that officers use
to justify their stops. The principal components analysis yields a score that reflects the weight
of each individual item. We apply those weights to each record to compute a score for each
of the dimensions based on the combination of stop factor and additional circumstances that
are checked off for that record. We then aggregate these legality scores for each precinct and
year. These legality scores then are entered as predictors in the models predicting marijuana
enforcement patterns18.
We use two different metrics to assess the extent to which these factors indicate
reasonable suspicion. First, we assess the extent to which including them in models
estimating enforcement patterns improves our model fit19.

A consistent narrative of

suspicion for marijuana possession would suggest that the documented justifications would

17

Narrative or text explanations of the meaning of “other” were extremely rare.
Because the use of principal components analysis for binary variables has raised some reliability concerns, we
also estimate models using several of the key binary variables themselves. Substantive results are similar.
19
Model fit is measured using the marginal R-squared measure described in Ballinger (2004).
18
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explain a nontrivial proportion of the variation in enforcement patterns. On the other hand,
arbitrary stop behaviors, or randomness in which stop justifications are invoked, would do
little to improve model fit.

Next, we examine whether any of the separate legality

dimensions are statistically significant predictors of enforcement patterns. For example, we
examine whether a legality dimension that includes behaviors indicative of “casing” a
location for a crime is a significant predictor of enforcement patterns. We anticipate, for
example, that marijuana enforcement would be more prevalent in precincts where drug
suspicion justifies a greater portion of stop patterns.
4. Stop Efficiency and Public Safety
Finally, we examine the public safety payoffs associated with street-level marijuana
enforcement, particularly the extent to which marijuana stops are associated with the success
of OMP objectives. In particular, the objectives of SQF center on crime detection and
weapons seizures. Whatever the economic or social costs associated with marijuana stop
tactics, to the extent that marijuana stops are linked to weapons detection (measured both by
the rate at which weapons stops lead to arrests, and the rate that stops lead to weapons
seizures), this relationship might reflect a positive spillover, and a public safety benefit, of
marijuana policing. But the converse would indicate a public safety tradeoff or compromise:
if marijuana stops are negatively associated with weapons seizures or overall arrests, then the
search for marijuana offenders comes at the cost of public safety.

IV. RESULTS
A. Data Description
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1. Average Precinct Characteristics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 375 precinct-year observations in our
analysis, and underscores the diversity of New York City, in terms of not only race and
socioeconomic conditions, but crime and policing conditions as well. For example, while
NYPD officers make an average of 137 stops per year on suspicion of marijuana possession
in each precinct, there are some precincts where no marijuana possession stops are made in a
given year, and others in which more than 1,000 such stops are made. Similar patterns are
seen in stop activity more broadly: the highest-stop precinct-year had more than 70 times as
many street stops made as in the lowest-stop observation.
Table 1 also suggests that while New York City is quite diverse, the City’s police
precincts are extremely segregated. On average, police precincts are 30% white and 26%
black; however, there are both precincts where virtually no whites live, and virtually no
blacks live, and precincts where more than 80% of residents are a single race. Similar
patterns emerge for Hispanics and for several aspects of socioeconomic disadvantage, as well
as violent crime levels.
[Table 1 about here]
2. Marijuana, Order Maintenance Policing, and Race-Ethnic Disparities
Both SQF activity and marijuana possession arrests have been touted as part of the
NYPD’s OMP strategy. However, we find that street stops for marijuana and marijuana
possession arrests are largely separate phenomena. Figure 2 shows that many of the precincts
highest in marijuana arrests record the fewest stops on suspicion of marijuana possession. It
is possible that differences between observed stop and arrest patterns are, at least in part, an
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artifact of reporting practices. Under De Bour, for example, the “reasonable suspicion”
required for a street stop may be met and superseded by “probable cause” if marijuana is
found, which would permit escalation by Level IV under De Bour (i.e., resulting in a
“probable cause” arrest). Although the NYPD Patrol Guide requires that street stops be
documented using UF-250 forms whether or not an arrest results, officers may substitute
arrest documentation when stops lead to arrest in place of the stop documentation. As a
result, some of the arrest-producing stops are censored from the UF-250 database. The New
York City Civilian Complaint Review Board (2002) and United States Commission on
Human Rights (2000) have both established that under-filing of UF-250 forms has
historically been a problem.

The inconsistency of stop documentation underscores the

importance of examining race disparities in the totality of marijuana enforcement based not
simply on documented stop totals or arrest totals, but considering a combination of the two.
[Figure 2 about here]
Nonetheless, whether examining arrests or street stops, the majority of marijuana
possession stops take place disproportionately in neighborhoods housing the city’s minority
population, both compared to their representation in the city’s population, and their
representation among marijuana arrestees. Accordingly, Table 2 shows that blacks are
overrepresented in the NYPD’s marijuana stop activity compared to their representation in
the general population.

For example, officers stop blacks on suspicion of marijuana

possession at a rate of 14.83 per 1,000 population, while Hispanics are only stopped 5.41
times per 1,000 population, and whites are stopped only 1.96 times per 1,000 population.
This pattern also holds for stop activity more broadly, with blacks stopped at a rate of 564 per
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1,000 in the population and Hispanics stopped 269 times per 1,000, while whites are only
stopped 93 times per 1,000.
Similar disparities exist for marijuana arrests, with 48 blacks arrested for marijuana
possession for every 1,000 in the population, 24 Hispanics arrested per 1,000 population, and
6 whites arrested per 1,000 population. The targeting of enforcement efforts toward blacks
and Hispanics is dramatically out of proportion to national statistics that suggest comparable
usage rates across racial groups (SAMHSA 2004, 2005) or higher rates of marijuana use
among whites (Saxe et al. 2001; Johnston et al. 2005).
[Table 2 about here]
Disparities in marijuana enforcement can also be seen geographically. Figure 3
details the geocoded locations of marijuana stops made between 2004 and 2008, and shows
substantial clustering in areas like the 73rd, 75th, and 79th precincts. Figure 4 arrays these
precincts by race.

The places with the highest concentration of marijuana stops are

predominantly black neighborhoods.
[Figures 3 and 4 about here]
B. Modeling Results
1. Marijuana Stop Levels
Table 3 presents the estimates from negative binomial GEE models predicting
marijuana stop levels by precinct and year. These models further quantify the disparities
suggested in Figures 3 and 4: marijuana stop activity is significantly higher in neighborhoods
with a greater concentration of black residents, and this relationship is not explained by
differences in local socioeconomic conditions, or by historic crime levels, or general
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enforcement patterns (past-year marijuana arrests, or current year stop totals). For Hispanics,
the stop rates also are higher with higher population concentrations, but these effects are not
significant once controls for neighborhood social and crime conditions are included. In
Model 5, marijuana stops are negatively correlated with prior year precinct crime rates and
enforcement activity: there are fewer marijuana stops in precincts in which violent crime
rates are higher, and where marijuana arrests in the past year were higher. Marijuana stops
are predicted by the total number of stops concurrently in the precinct. In other words, there
are fewer marijuana stops in places where marijuana arrests are greater, and more stops
where violent crime is lower, and where the total number of stops is higher. Marijuana stops,
in these places, seem to be a marginal enforcement activity – in effect, a luxury – that is
pursued in predominantly black neighborhoods beyond other enforcement efforts.
[Table 3 about here]
The negative relationship between past-year marijuana arrests and current-year
marijuana stops can be interpreted in two ways. One interpretation is that this is a reporting
anomaly and artifact: officers making marijuana stops that produce arrests are bypassing the
stop documentation in favor of arrest documentation. Since marijuana arrest rates in these
places are higher, there may be unrecorded stops that in fact are producing arrests. Or, it
could be that marijuana arrests are produced by a different process than the process that
produces stops. In New York’s marijuana statutes, “plain view” possession, such as smelling
smoke or observing marijuana, is itself probable cause for an arrest, and detection of
marijuana under those circumstances obviates the predicate or antecedent of the stop. Levine
and Small (2008) question the legality of those stops, citing a long tradition of “dropsy”
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arrests that essentially entrap persons who are stopped into revealing that they possess
marijuana by emptying their pockets.
2. Totality of Enforcement
If marijuana stops and arrests are conjoined in a complex enforcement process that
produces marijuana arrests but suppresses indicia of stops, then explaining the totality of
marijuana enforcement requires that we view stops and arrests as two parts of an integrated
tactic. Accordingly, we estimated models for the totality of marijuana enforcement: that is,
the sum of marijuana stops and arrests within a precinct20. Table 4 shows that, as with total
marijuana stops, total enforcement levels are significantly higher in precincts with large
black populations, and this disparity is robust to controls for socioeconomic conditions, pastyear crime complaints, and prior enforcement patterns.

Examining total marijuana

enforcement the disparity for Hispanics also remains significant when other precinct
characteristics are controlled. The totality of marijuana enforcement is concentrated in the
city’s black communities.
[Table 4 about here]
Here, there are interesting and important differences compared to the results in Table
3 on stops alone. First, with due regard for the limitations of comparing R2s across models,
model fits are much improved: the pseudo-R2 in Model 5 in Table 4 is nearly 50% greater
than in the comparable model in Table 3. Next, unlike models predicting stop activity alone,
total marijuana enforcement is significantly and positively predicted by marijuana arrests in
the previous year, further underscoring the importance of considering stop and arrest activity

20

To avoid double-counting stops that lead to an arrest and are documented in the UF-250 forms, we subtract
the number of marijuana arrests documented in the UF-250 forms from the “stop plus arrest” totals.
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combined. Further, unlike stop activity alone, total marijuana enforcement is significantly
predicted by violent crime in Models 3 and 4, though this relationship is diminished and
statistically insignificant in Model 5, once total stop activity is controlled for.

The

insignificance of violent crime complaints in the face of overall stop activity suggests that
marijuana stop and arrest activity may be a consequence of the broader stop and frisk
targeted at high-crime precincts. Moreover, the persistently higher enforcement levels in
black and Hispanic neighborhoods suggest that the tactics used in these precincts are a
disproportionate response to local crime conditions. As Fagan and Davies (2000) and Fagan
et al. (2010) showed with stop activity more generally, marijuana enforcement seems to be
focused not on violent crime but on predominantly minority neighborhoods.
3. Marijuana Enforcement and OMP
Table 5 examines the links between total marijuana enforcement and the two
documented objectives of order maintenance: reduction of disorder and the search for
weapons. Through programs such as Operation Condor21, marijuana enforcement was an
application of Broken Windows theory, where policing of minor crimes was instrumental in
reducing rates of violent crime by reducing disorder. Weapons were a part of this focus. We
estimate a series of models that include crime complaints for several disorder crimes, such as
public drunkenness, loitering and other offenses against public order, and the concentration
street stops on weapons.
Model 1 in Table 5 reproduces Model 5 from Table 4, examining the demographic,
socioeconomic, violent crime, and general enforcement predictors of marijuana stop activity.
This sets out a baseline to examine the influence of disorder in Model 2 in Table 5. Model 2

21

supra Note 3
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shows virtually no relationship between disorder complaints and marijuana street stops. The
model fit is only slightly changed, and the parameter estimate for disorder is not significant.
The racial disparity for the percent non-Hispanic black population and the percent Hispanic
also is unaffected with the inclusion of disorder.
Model 3 tests the link between marijuana stop activity and the other principal goal of
OMP, the search for weapons. We again find a strong and significant connection between
marijuana enforcement and precinct stop activity (total stops), and also find a significant
relationship between marijuana enforcement and the share of stops that are based on
suspicion of weapons possession. Marijuana stops and arrests are more prevalent not only in
precincts where overall stop activity is greater, but in precincts where, holding stop levels
constant, a greater portion of stops are on suspicion of weapons possession. As in Model 1,
marijuana enforcement is not predicted by violent crime, though prior year marijuana arrests
predict current year activity, a sign of the stability of the pattern and practice over time.
In Model 4, which includes both disorder complaints and weapons focus as additional
controls, the predictive power of weapons focus is virtually unchanged. The results are
unchanged. Not only is enforcement disconnected from local crime conditions once overall
stop patterns are controlled for, but it also is disconnected from the indicia of disorder that is
central to the logic of OMP.
Marijuana enforcement activity is most active in precincts where overall enforcement
is most focused on weapons detection, but with little connection to crime or disorder
conditions in those places. This pattern raises unsettling concerns that officers use marijuana
enforcement as a pretext for searching for weapons. It seems that marijuana enforcement is
an adjunct to overall OMP enforcement, disconnected to local crime conditions but closely
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tied to the search for weapons. Total OMP enforcement, including the search for weapons,
leads to more extensive marijuana enforcement, but the allocation logic is more closely tied
to the racial and ethnic composition of the area than crime conditions or social structure.
[Table 5 about here]
4. The Legality of Stops
While the modifications of the UF-250 form following the Spitzer (1999) report have
enabled a more structured identification of the legal circumstances justifying a street stop,
officers maintain considerable flexibility in reporting stop circumstances. Table 6 presents
factor loadings from a principal components factor analysis of the stop-level data, identifying
consistencies in the cited stop rationales. Although these factors combine to explain only
half the total variation in stop justification, several consistencies emerge.
[Table 6 about here]
The first factor suggests that stops justified by a suspect description are frequently
also justified with a report by a victim, witness, or officer. This relationship is encouraging,
because it indicates that the descriptions used to justify stops have been obtained from legally
sufficient sources,22 rather than a vague profile unconnected to the case. The second factor
identifies suspicion generated by the suspect changing direction at the sight of the officer and
offering evasive responses when questioned. The third factor identifies suspicion generated
by suspects in a “high crime area” at a time of day fitting the incidence of a crime.
The fourth factor identifies suspects who appear to be casing a victim or a location, or
acting as a lookout in conjunction with a planned crime. The fifth factor identifies stops
22

People v. Benjamin (1980), People v. Schwing (2005).
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justified for “other” reasons, either as a stop justification alone or in conjunction with “other”
as additional circumstances. The sixth factor identifies actions indicating a drug transaction,
and the seventh identifies stops based on an individual carrying a “suspicious object.” While
these factors explain only half the variance in the justifications for stop activity, they form
substantively meaningful narratives that may explain disparities in marijuana street stop
practices.
Table 7 replicates the marijuana enforcement models from Table 4, including
additional controls for the strongest individual items in each of the seven stop factors. We
also estimated these models using only marijuana street stops, since only a portion of
marijuana arrests result from undocumented marijuana stops. The results are the same for
both sets of models, suggesting that legal narratives fit comparably in explaining both stops
and total enforcement. For each model, we note changes in goodness-of-fit when the stop
rationales are included.
In each of the models, several of the stop factors computed in Table 5 indeed are
significant predictors of marijuana enforcement at the precinct level.

In all models,

marijuana stops are significantly more prevalent in precincts where stops are likely to be
justified by suspicion of a drug transaction, suggesting that police officers are particularly
sensitive to drug issues in these precincts. It is unlikely that the “drug transaction” factor
simply reflects high levels of marijuana stops, since documented marijuana stops comprise
fewer than three percent of the stops recorded in the city from 2004-2008. Instead, the
factors are likely to reflect police enforcement priorities and narratives of suspicion in each
precinct.
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Marijuana stops are also more prevalent in precincts where large portions of street
stops are justified by “other” rationales, and in some models, when stops take place in what
officers deem a “high-crime area” (which is correlated with “time of day”). These stop
rationales are cause for concern, as neither of these factors, on their face, are constitutionally
sufficient to justify a street stop, and are opaque with respect to the specific conditions that
motivated the stop. While “high crime area” may justify a stop in conjunction with other
factors, it is not legally sufficient in conjunction with “time of day”. Finally, marijuana stops
are less prevalent in precincts justifying a large portion of stops with suspect descriptions, or
the suspicion of casing. Table 4 suggested that when considered in the context of overall
stop patterns, marijuana enforcement was disconnected from crime conditions, and the
negative influence of these crime-specific stop rationales seems to confirm that disconnect.
The bottom rows of Table 7 examine the goodness-of-fit of stop models, both with
and without controls for precinct–level stop rationales. While Model 1 suggests that stop
rationales explain more of the variation in stop patterns than does racial composition itself,
these factors explain less than five percent more of the variance in enforcement activity.
Moreover, as more controls are added for precinct socioeconomic conditions, crime levels,
and more general enforcement patterns, models including stop justifications actually explain
a smaller portion of total variance in enforcement. More detailed models with progressively
more controls indicate that the stop rationales explain less and less of the variation in
marijuana stop levels. These models suggest few systematic links between the rationales for
street stop activity and the levels of marijuana enforcement realized. Instead, even with a full
set of legal justifications, marijuana enforcement seems to be explained by the racial
composition of the area and previous enforcement levels, rather than crime conditions or
social structure. Despite the inclusion of legal justifications and rationales for stops,
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marijuana enforcement is significantly higher precincts with large black and Hispanic
populations.

The persistent race disparities in marijuana enforcement activity suggest

legality may simply be a cosmetic or post-hoc justification for overall marijuana
enforcement.
[Table 7 about here]
5. Stop Efficacy and Public Safety
Given the emphasis of OMP on weapons detection and seizure, and the links between
marijuana and weapons policing demonstrated in Table 5, we evaluate the public safety
implications of marijuana enforcement based primarily on its role in weapons detection.
Table 8 classifies the 2.2 million stops between 2004 and 2008 into four categories, based on
the crimes suspected that are recorded for each stop: marijuana possession stops, weapons
possession stops, violent crime stops, and “other” stops, encompassing property crimes,
minor crimes such as trespass and quality of life offenses, other offenses, and stops with no
suspected crime interpretable. The table suggests that street stops are highly unlikely to lead
directly to weapon seizures – weapons are seized in fewer than one percent of stops. Even
among stops driven by suspicion of weapons possession, seizure rates are less than three
percent. Marijuana stops, despite a prevalence that covaries with weapons stops at the
precinct level, lead to weapon seizures in only approximately one-half of one percent of
stops. If marijuana enforcement is designed to stop more serious crime by catching criminals
“on their day off” (Maple and Mitchell, 1999), it is quite inefficient.
[Table 8 about here]
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At the precinct level, the link between the tactic of marijuana street stops and success
in the search for weapons is equally tenuous. Figure 5 shows that the average annual count of
weapons seizures is indeed higher in precincts where police make more marijuana stops.23
But this relationship is likely spurious to other policing factors: weapons seizures are more
often produced by stops unrelated to marijuana. Moreover, Figure 6 suggests that at high
levels of marijuana stops within a precinct, the likelihood that any type of stop yields a
weapon seizure declines. In other words, these additional marijuana stops have diminishing
marginal returns in the search for weapons.
[Figures 5 and 6 about here]
The negative relationship between marijuana stops and weapon seizures may,
alternatively, reflect a deterrent effect in which citizens refrain from carrying weapons in
anticipation of being stopped by the police. However, per capita homicide rates declined by
2.7 percent across the country between 2004 and 2008, suggesting a nationwide decrease in
the prevalence and use of firearms. The reduced prevalence of weapon possession in New
York City is likely to reflect this secular trend, rather than a causal effect of local policing
practices, and high levels of street stops are likely to be limited in their productivity.
We test this notion further in a series of models that examine the public safety
benefits associated with marijuana stop activity. Table 9 presents the regression coefficients
from four models, each with a negative binomial functional form predicting the number of
weapons seizures made from street stops in a given precinct and year. The first two models

23

This relationship is sensitive to measurement choice. Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate the relationship between
enforcement and public safety using logarithmic transformation of both stops and seizures. When using raw
counts of stops and seizures, the positive relationship between stops and seizures appears to be driven by a
single high-stop observation (103rd Precinct, 2004), and the relationship between stops and seizure rates
declines more rapidly.
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in this table, like the stop and enforcement models in Tables 2-4 and 6, use a population
exposure. The third and fourth models use precinct stop totals as an exposure for seizures,
thereby approximating a model of the precinct seizure rate24.
Models 1 and 2 in this table suggest that weapon seizures are indeed higher in
precincts and years with higher overall stop volumes; however, they suggest no significant
relationship between marijuana enforcement and weapons detection above and beyond that
associated with total stop volume. In other words, marijuana enforcement adds no public
safety benefit to overall OMP efforts. Moreover, when considering the likelihood of each
individual street stop to lead to a weapon seizure in Models 3 and 4, marijuana enforcement
is not only unrelated to weapon seizures, the relationship between total stops and seizures per
stop is significant and negative, suggesting that stop-and-frisk patterns may have diminishing
returns in the search for weapons when conducted in conjunction with marijuana
enforcement.
[Table 9 about here]

V. DISCUSSION
A. Epidemiology of Marijuana Enforcement
Since mid-1990s, OMP strategies have leveraged the enforcement of social and
physical disorder in attempts to identify more serious offenders, uncover weapons, and

24

We estimated the risk of Type II error in identifying the effects of marijuana stops (or overall enforcement)
on weapons seizures by conducting a power analysis. We use G*Power 3 (Faul et al., 2007) to estimate power
for varying effect sizes, using the Cohen (1988) convention of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 for small, medium, and large
effect sizes. We find over 90% power to detect even small effects using two-tailed t-tests at =0.05 with 300
precinct-year observations.
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reduce crime opportunities. The result was the aggressive interdiction, temporary detention,
and questioning of New Yorkers, an average of more than half a million times each year
beginning in 2004, with about nine in ten resulting in no finding of wrongdoing (Fagan et al,
2010). The manifestation of disorder that attracted the most intensive police attention was
the plain-view possession of marijuana (Levine and Small 2008, Golub et al. 2007, Harcourt
and Ludwig 2007). Over the decade beginning in 1998, NYPD officers made more than
35,000 misdemeanor marijuana arrests per year (Levine and Small, 2008), an effort that
required a massive mobilization of police resources, and a substantial outlay of public
dollars.
The NYPD’s focus on low-level disorder, and on marijuana in particular, has raised
recurring concerns related both to the racial distribution of enforcement patterns and to the
disconnect with the crime control interests of criminal justice policy. We find that these
concerns remain salient, and are well-grounded empirically. We show significant racial
disparities in the implementation of marijuana enforcement activity; street stops for
marijuana are more prevalent in precincts with large black populations, as are combined
marijuana stop and arrest totals.

This disparity holds up across neighborhoods after

controlling for local crime and socioeconomic conditions. Moreover, stop patterns are
disconnected from patterns of the social disorder complaints that are a central feature of order
maintenance policing. Instead, marijuana stops are higher in precincts with a greater focus
on weapons enforcement.
1. The Re-Engineering of Broken Windows Theory
The disconnect between marijuana enforcement patterns and precinct disorder
conditions underscores the divergence of OMP tactics from their underpinnings in the Broken
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Windows theory. In its pristine form, Broken Windows presented disorder as a signal that
local guardianship was weak and that crime would be tolerated, inviting a criminal invasion
(Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Skogan, 1990). In the development of OMP, Jack Maple saw
this link as mystical, and dismissed the idea that murderers and other serious offenders would
be affected by neighborhood conditions such as graffiti, abandoned cars, or trash-strewn
vacant lots (Maple and Mitchell, 1999). He was therefore far less concerned with the muchpublicized “squeegee men” who harassed motorists at the entrances to bridges and tunnels
entering Manhattan, and more concerned with the idea that serious offenders, when not
actively involved in violent crimes, were likely to be engaged in disorderly behavior such as
public drinking or smoking marijuana. This meant that the disorderly were likely to be
carrying weapons or other contraband, or to be on their way to or from robberies or other
violent crimes. And to stop them, police had to preemptively and aggressively engage them,
question them, and if necessary, frisk and search them for weapons or contraband.
The disconnect between marijuana enforcement and disorder complaints, and its close
ties to weapons enforcement and precinct racial composition, suggests that street stops for
marijuana possession may serve as a pretext for higher rates of citizen interdictions in pursuit
of weapons in minority neighborhoods, rather than the regulation of low-level offenses or
even enforcement of marijuana laws. In other words, police in New York are doubling down
on weapons enforcement by also searching for marijuana.
2. Pot as Pretext
The legal rationales for marijuana enforcement also suggest both a racial skew and a
pretextual nature of citizen stops and marijuana arrests. Despite recent litigation requiring
police officers to specify the reasons for each stop, we find recurring patterns of stops that
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lack legal justification under both federal and New York law. The documented justifications
for street stops suggest that marijuana stops are most prevalent not only where officers place
a high priority on drug transactions, but also where stops are justified based on suspects’
presence in a “high crime area” and “other” non-specific circumstances, justifications which,
on their face, are constitutionally insufficient to justify a street stop. Moreover, the legal
narratives of suspicion provided for stop activity do little to explain the precinct-level
variation in stop activity. Black and Hispanic precincts seem to be targeted for marijuana
enforcement at levels above what legal justifications and other precinct characteristics would
suggest are appropriate.
B. Public Safety Implications
Marijuana enforcement is inefficient to a point where it may distract from other
strategies to produce security. While weapons seizures are indeed more prevalent in areas
with higher stop levels, each street stop made is associated with a lower probability of
weapon seizures, suggesting diminishing returns to SQF activity. Although the detection of
weapons is one of the overarching goals of OMP, and marijuana enforcement is one of the
tactical engines of OMP, fewer than one half of one percent of marijuana stops lead to the
seizure of a weapon, and marijuana enforcement is not significantly correlated with the
detection of weapons.
The public safety rationale for marijuana enforcement is not well-grounded in
criminological theory. Beyond the relative futility of marijuana stops, and street stops more
generally, in the detection of firearms, the links between marijuana and more serious crime
are tenuous. Given the doubts cast on the causal relationship between physical and social
disorder and more serious crime (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999; Harcourt, 1998, 2001;

June 2010

GELLER AND FAGAN

38

Taylor, 2001), there is little reason to expect that the disruption of marijuana possession and
use will reduce violent crime or any other crime.
Marijuana itself is also largely disconnected from dangerous behavior, particularly
violent crime. As early as the 1930’s, while lurid headlines across the country proclaimed
that marijuana was a dangerous drug that caused crime, these claims were dismissed in a sixyear scientific study at the New York Academy of Medicine (Mayor’s Committee on
Marihuana, 1944). The NYAM scientists found that marijuana is neither addictive, nor that
it was a “determinating factor” in major crimes. Research beginning in the 1970s concluded
much the same. The linkage of marijuana to crime is both contingent on contextual factors,
and spurious to underlying personal characteristics (for reviews, see: Watters et al., 1985;
Fagan, 1990, 1993; MacCoun et al., 2003).
In addition, contrary to “gateway” hypotheses, few users of marijuana progress to
using harder drugs, and the causal paths are complex and mediated by both observed and
unobserved personal characteristics. For example, Golub and Johnson (2001) dismiss dire
predictions of future hard drug abuse by youths who came of age in the 1990s. They
examined several waves of the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse from 1979-97,
and concluded that any increase in youthful marijuana use in the 1990s has been offset by
lower rates of progression to hard drug use among youths born in the 1970s.

And

connections between marijuana use and progression to other drugs is more likely to be
produced through a correlation with (unobserved) personal characteristics rather than a
causal path (van Ours, 2003). Nor is there a connection through marijuana markets: several
studies show that marijuana markets are segmented from cocaine and heroin markets,
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reducing the likelihood that disrupting marijuana buys will have any effects on the more
violence-prone heroin and cocaine markets (see Caulkins and Reuter, 1998, for a review).
In light of the empirical evidence documenting marijuana’s equivocal relationship to
both more serious forms of drug use and to other crimes, the city’s dogged pursuit of
marijuana use begs explanation. For a short time after the war on marijuana began in New
York, the discourse on the escalation of marijuana enforcement focused on how marijuana
markets had replaced the waning street markets in cocaine and crack, how marijuana had
become more potent and its users more behaviorally unpredictable, and that the violence of
those markets had migrated to marijuana markets (Flynn, 2001). However, the prediction of
marijuana-fueled violence seems to have been a false alarm. Homicides reached a 45 year
low of 466 in 2009, and overall crime is down by 35% since that discourse on marijuana was
first advanced nearly a decade ago. Marijuana use rates among high school and college
students across the nation have been relatively flat since 1999 (Johnston et al. 2005), yet the
insistence on marijuana’s dangers still translates into widespread and racially imbalanced
misdemeanor marijuana arrests. Nor are the arrests brief and non-intrusive encounters:
persons arrested on misdemeanor marijuana charges are routinely booked, strip-searched, and
detained for as long as 48 hours until they are arraigned on charges that are almost always
dismissed (Golway, 2000). Observing a sweep of six marijuana arrests at the outset of the
current war on marijuana a decade ago, one detective lamented that rather than lowering
crime, “[w]e're just ruining people's lives now” (Sargent, 2001).

VI. CONCLUSION
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The striking feature of the war on marijuana in New York City is not simply the racial
imbalance in enforcement compared to the racial distribution of marijuana use (cf., Saxe et
al., 2001; Johnston et al., 2005), nor its disconnect from crime conditions or the legality of
marijuana stops, nor its diminishing returns in the chase for weapons.

Rather, the broad

reach of marijuana enforcement, and of OMP more generally, deserves the greatest attention.
In 2006 the NYPD made more than 32,000 arrests for marijuana possession, and over
506,000 stops, including 64,166 stops of black males between the ages of 15 and 19, or an
average rate of 77 stops for every 100 such persons. 25. Of these stops, fewer than four
percent resulted in an arrest, and fewer than one half of one percent revealed a weapon.26
OMP practices have persisted through sharp criticism (Spitzer, 1999; Greene, 1999;
Harcourt, 2001; Levine and Small, 2008) and civil rights litigation against the City.
However, the intractability of racial disparities in police practices in the face of prior judicial
efforts at constitutional oversight raise difficult questions about the prospects for either legal
or democratic regulation of policing. The deep reach of OMP into the city’s minority
communities has serious social costs, undermining perceived police legitimacy, and
potentially leading to civilian withdrawal from the co-production of public safety. The
diminishing returns of street stops in the production of public safety suggests not only that
the practice not only has an unjustified and disparate impact on the city’s minority
population, that the broader enforcement strategy is misguided its approach to crime control.
25

ESRI projections suggest that approximately 6.6 million of the city’s 8.3 million residents in 2006 were over
the age of fifteen.
26
Street stops are hardly neutral with respect to the person stopped and found to be innocent of any
wrongdoing. Stuntz (1998) notes four distinct harms that victims of unjustified and inaccurate stops might
suffer. “The first is a harm to the victim's privacy - the injury suffered if some agent of the state rummages
around in the victim's briefcase, or examines the contents of his jacket pockets. The second is … "targeting
harm," The injury suffered by one who is singled out by the police and publicly treated like a criminal suspect.
Third is the injury that flows from discrimination, the harm a black suspect feels when he believes he is treated
the way he is treated because he is black. Fourth is the harm that flows from police violence, the physical
injury and associated fear of physical injury that attends the improper police use of force.”
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Marijuana enforcement consumes a great deal of police resources, and for the past
decade has been a stable feature of the policing landscape in New York. The social and
political objectification of marijuana through this time gave police institutions the
opportunity to transform marijuana enforcement to a use virtually unrelated to their central
aim of crime reduction.

The purpose of the marijuana doctrine, instead, may be the

expansion of the panoptical or intelligence-generating dimension of police work, enhancing
the centrality of police organizations without the burden of distributional or efficiency
concerns. As practiced, the lack of police discretion in marijuana enforcement signals
indifference to those concerns, and threatens to instantiate among the policed a deeply-rooted
culture of permanent challenge to police authority. Whether policing without legitimacy is
sustainable remains a worrisome question.
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Table 1: Precinct-Level Enforcement, Demographic, Socioeconomic, and Crime
Characteristics (N=375 precinct-year observations)
Mean
SD
Minimum Maximum
Marijuana possession stops
137.2
163.9
0
1,303
Marijuana possession arrests
419.9
445.9
7
2,472
Total marijuana enforcement
524.9
512.8
10
2,787
Total street stops
5,920.8
4,544.1
442
31,242
% Non-Hispanic white
30%
0.25
<1%
84%
% Non-Hispanic black
26%
0.26
<1%
89%
% Hispanic
30%
0.21
5%
79%
% Non-Hispanic other
14%
0.12
2%
70%
% Poverty
20%
0.11
5%
45%
% Unemployed
10%
0.05
3%
23%
Physical Disorder (factor score)
0.06
1.66
-2.16
5.10
Violent crime (complaints)
651.0
333.1
66
1,937
Sources: Street stop and crime complaints: NYPD, 2004-2008, Arrests: NY State
DCJS, 2004-2008, Demographic and employment data: ESRI, 2006, Poverty data:
American Community Survey, 2005-2007, Physical Disorder, NYCHVS, 2005.
22nd Precinct (Central Park) is excluded from calculations.
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Table 2: Population and NYPD Enforcement Activity by Race/Ethnicity
(rate per 1,000 population in parentheses)
Race/Ethnicity
Black
Hispanic
White
Other
Race Unknown

Marijuana Stops
29,854
(14.83)
13,315
(5.41)
4,931
(1.96)
3,604
(2,80)

All Street
Stops
1,134,539
(563.71)
661,546
(268.59)
233,179
(92.81)
191,025
(148.91)

Marijuana
Arrests
97,069
(48.23)
58,298
(23.67)
15,168
(6.04)
2,886
(2.25)

Total Arrests
748,029
(371.66)
521,386
(211.69)
181,545
(72.26)
56,487
(44.03)

57

3,859

1,536

15,834

Estimated
2006
Population
2,012,646
2,463,016
2,512,415

1,282,782
N/A

Total N
51,761
2,224,148
174,957
1,523,281
8,270,859
Totals may not sum to 100% due to rounding
Sources: Stop counts and percents extrapolated from 10% random sample of stops from UF-250 data.
Arrest totals based on DCJS counts, 2004-2008. Population distribution based on citywide ESRI projections
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Table 3: Negative Binomial Regression of Marijuana Stops by Precinct Demography, Socioeconomic
Conditions, Crime, and Enforcement, 2004-2008
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Including
Including
PastIncluding
SES and
Year
Past-Year
Including
Racial
Foreign
Violent
Marijuana
Total
VARIABLES
Composition
Born
Crime
Arrests
Stops
% Non-Hispanic Black
% Hispanic
% Other Race
Socioeconomic Disadvantage
% Foreign Born
Past-Year Violent Crime
(1000 complaints)
Past-Year Marijuana Arrests
(1000s)
Total Stops (logged)
Constant

2.706
[0.450]
1.255
[0.471]
0.746
[0.910]

**
**

2.583
[0.674]
1.73
[1.032]
2.049
[1.331]
0.0819
[0.156]
-2.658
[1.309]

**

*

2.097
[0.721]
1.485
[1.088]
2.144
[1.255]
0.0605
[0.178]
-2.404
[1.338]
0.299
[0.334]

**

2.279
[0.678]
1.612
[1.056]
1.939
[1.247]
0.0444
[0.171]
-2.134
[1.361]
0.532
[0.346]
-0.387
[0.131]

**

**

-7.746 **
-7.191 **
-7.122 **
-7.271 **
[0.349]
[0.459]
[0.511]
[0.506]
Observations
375
375
300
300
Number of pct
75
75
75
75
2
Marginal-R
0.23
0.32
0.31
-0.01
Models are Negative Binomial GEE's with population exposure and AR(1) covariance within precincts.
All models include fixed effects for borough and year.
Standard errors in brackets, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

1.654
[0.656]
0.614
[0.919]
1.045
[1.267]
0.016
[0.164]
-1.274
[1.134]
-0.65
[0.302]
-0.312
[0.152]
1.06
[0.126]
-15.16
[1.186]
300
75
0.46

*

*
*
**
**
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Table 4: Negative Binomial Regression of Total Marijuana Enforcement by Precinct Demography,
Socioeconomic Conditions, Crime, and Enforcement, 2004-2008
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Including
Including
PastIncluding
SES and
Year
Past-Year
Including
Racial
Foreign
Violent
Marijuana
Total
VARIABLES
Composition
Born
Crime
Arrests
Stops
% Non-Hispanic Black

2.583
[0.337]
2.230
[0.408]
-0.602
[0.684]

% Hispanic
% Other Race
Socioeconomic Disadvantage
% Foreign Born

**
**

2.387
[0.455]
1.973
[0.688]
-0.637
[0.936]
0.0915
[0.112]
-0.221
[0.772]

**
**

Lag Violent Crime
Complaints (thousands)
Lag Marijuana Arrests
(thousands)
Total Stops (logged)

2.089
[0.466]
1.968
[0.719]
-0.365
[0.846]
-0.0299
[0.112]
-0.253
[0.842]
0.665
[0.269]

**
**

*

1.986
[0.446]
1.899
[0.708]
-0.234
[0.853]
-0.0244
[0.111]
-0.475
[0.886]
0.580
[0.259]
0.192
[0.0757]

**
**

*
*

Constant

-6.498 **
-6.294 **
-6.625 **
-6.548 **
[0.396]
[0.445]
[0.426]
[0.426]
Observations
375
375
300
300
Number of pct
75
75
75
75
2
Marginal-R
0.61
0.73
0.76
0.61
Models are Negative Binomial GEE's with population exposure and AR(1) covariance within precincts.
All models include fixed effects for borough and year.
Standard errors in brackets, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

1.688
[0.466]
1.580
[0.677]
-0.624
[0.814]
-0.0458
[0.11]
-0.143
[0.745]
0.131
[0.221]
0.241
[0.0665]
0.454
[0.0878]
-9.97
[0.794]
300
75
0.76

**
*

**
**
**

Table 5: Negative Binomial Regressions Predicting Total Marijuana Enforcement by
Demographics, Crime, Other Enforcement, and OMP Objectives
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

June 2010

Variables
% Non-Hispanic Black
% Hispanic
% Other Race
SES Disadvantage
% Foreign Born
Lag Violent Crime
Lag Marijuana Arrests
Total Stops (log)
Lag Disorder Complaints
% Weapons Stops

GELLER AND FAGAN
"Full model"
from Table 4,
Model 5
1.688
[0.466]
1.58
[0.677]
-0.624
[0.814]
-0.0458
[0.110]
-0.143
[0.745]
0.131
[0.221]
0.241
[0.0665]
0.454
[0.0878]

52

Including
disorder
complaints
**
*

**
**

1.669
[0.457]
1.491
[0.670]
-0.638
[0.803]
-0.0738
[0.107]
0.0446
[0.788]
0.344
[0.246]
0.243
[0.0654]
0.467
[0.0881]
-0.479
[0.349]

Including
disorder and
weapons

Including
weapons
**
*

**
**

1.59
[0.464]
1.507
[0.672]
-0.562
[0.803]
-0.0676
[0.106]
-0.107
[0.726]
0.1
[0.221]
0.244
[0.0670]
0.473
[0.0892]

**
*

**
**

0.598
*
[0.241]
Constant
-9.97 **
-10.03 **
-10.19 **
[0.794]
[0.777]
[0.798]
Observations
300
300
300
Number of precincts
75
75
75
Marginal-R2
0.76
0.78
0.76
Models estimated as GEE's with AR(1) covariance within precincts. All models include
borough and year. Standard errors in brackets.
Significance: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

1.573
[0.455]
1.421
[0.665]
-0.574
[0.794]
-0.0962
[0.103]
0.0782
[0.769]
0.316
[0.246]
0.246
[0.0650]
0.485
[0.0898]
-0.479
[0.349]
0.588
[0.245]
-10.24
[0.784]
300
75
0.78
fixed effects for

**
*

**
**

*
**
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Table 6: Factor Loadings from Principle Components Analysis of
Case-Level Stop Justifications (N=2,224,148)
Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Factor 4

Factor 5

Factor 6

Factor 7

Stop Rationales
Carrying Suspicious Object
Fits a relevant description
Casing a victim or location
Acting as a lookout
Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime
Actions indicative of a drug transaction
Furtive movements
Actions of engaging in a violent crime
Suspicious bulge
Other

-.041
.818
-.142
-.058
.107
-.083
-.144
.116
-.161
-.121

-.085
-.079
.015
.087
.258
.050
.578
.482
.042
-.158

0.014
-.094
.152
.187
.321
.026
.064
.102
.136
.037

-.054
-.035
.723
.607
-.112
-.059
-.162
.115
-.573
-.138

-.113
-.082
-.217
-.184
.015
-.100
-.296
.135
-.330
.804

-.015
-.059
-.244
.034
-.167
.817
.042
-.120
-.326
-.046

.783
-.040
-.034
-.070
.069
-.028
-.090
.112
-.081
-.007

Additional Circumstances
Report by victim/witness/officer
Ongoing investigation
Proximity to scene of offense
Evasive response to questioning
Associating with known criminals
Change direction at sight of officer
Area has high crime incidence
Time of day fits crime incidence
Sights or sounds of criminal activity
Other

.722
.159
.558
-.040
.170
-.100
-.204
-.048
.013
-.005

-.045
.254
.049
.692
.143
.651
-.115
.015
.124
.051

-.147
.393
.280
-.069
.277
-.055
.694
.718
-.022
-.141

-.007
.200
-.091
.086
-.011
.028
.091
.102
.050
-.022

-.026
.026
.001
-.025
.104
-.158
-.030
-.019
.155
.569

.036
-.207
-.064
.069
.433
.079
.113
-.002
-.014
-.116

.040
.068
-.055
.018
.021
-.043
.002
-.011
.639
-.091

2.170
.1085
.1085

1.701
.0851
.1936

1.533
.0766
.2702

1.225
.0613
.3315

1.174
.0587
.3902

1.123
.0561
.4463

1.047
.0523
.4986

Eigenvalue
Factor Variance Explained
Cumulative variance Explained
Factor loadings based on varimax rotation.
“Thematic” stop justifications (with factor loading

magnitudes greater than 0.6) are highlighted in bold.
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Table 7: Negative Binomial Regression of Total Marijuana Enforcement by Precinct Demography,
Socioeconomic Conditions, Crime, Enforcement, and Stop Justifications, 2004-2008
Model 1

Variables
% Non-Hispanic Black
% Hispanic
% Other Race

Racial
Composition
Only
2.025
[0.371]
1.94
[0.389]
-0.371
[0.672]

**
**

SES Disadvantage
% Foreign Born

Model 2
Including
SES and
Foreign
Born
1.832
[0.427]
1.577
[0.575]
-0.672
[0.847]
0.074
[0.101]
0.307
[0.520]

**
**

Lag Violent Crime

Model 3
Including
Past-Year
Violent
Crime
1.615
[0.455]
1.81
[0.589]
-0.177
[0.747]
-0.0532
[0.0981]
0.0537
[0.574]
0.686
[0.238]

**
**

**

Lag Marijuana Arrests

Model 4
Including
Past-Year
Marijuana
Arrests
1.512
[0.451]
1.749
[0.575]
0.0085
[0.726]
-0.0481
[0.0956]
-0.247
[0.603]
0.567
[0.221]
0.265
[0.0825]

Model 5

**
**

*
**

Total Stops (logged)

Legal Justifications
Fits relevant description
Evasive Response
High crime Area
Casing victim or location
Other Stop Justification

-0.973
[0.202]
0.411
[0.238]
0.274
[0.161]
-0.0944
[0.195]
0.406
[0.177]

**

*

-0.988
[0.205]
0.417
[0.241]
0.271
[0.162]
-0.0894
[0.196]
0.424
[0.178]

**

*

-0.968
[0.274]
0.399
[0.284]
0.527
[0.209]
-0.165
[0.199]
0.731
[0.247]

**

*

**

-0.994
[0.271]
0.379
[0.276]
0.528
[0.209]
-0.124
[0.199]
0.757
[0.237]

**

*

**

Including
Total
Stops
1.442
[0.426]
1.635
[0.547]
-0.151
[0.687]
-0.0652
[0.0966]
-0.147
[0.595]
0.234
[0.204]
0.292
[0.0821]
0.400
[0.101]

-0.469
[0.290]
0.428
[0.258]
0.391
[0.205]
-0.148
[0.193]
0.83
[0.238]

**
**

**
**

**
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0.790 **
0.786 **
0.732 **
0.782 **
0.868
[0.175]
[0.179]
[0.204]
[0.205]
[0.208]
Carrying suspicious
0.282
0.287
0.326
0.357
0.372
object
[0.306]
[0.313]
[0.395]
[0.394]
[0.397]
Constant
-6.298 **
-6.201 **
-6.549 **
-6.476 **
-9.669
[0.392]
[0.435]
[0.445]
[0.443]
[0.809]
Observations
375
375
300
300
300
Number of Precincts
75
75
75
75
75
Marginal R2 (no justifications)
0.61
0.61
0.73
0.76
0.76
Marginal R2 (with justifications)
0.64
0.64
0.69
0.69
0.65
Total marijuana enforcement computed as: marijuana stops+marijuana arrests - marijuana arrests in stop
documentation.
Models structured as GEE's with AR(1) covariance within precincts.
All models contain fixed effects for borough and year. Standard errors in brackets
Significance: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

**

**
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Table 8: Weapons Seizure Rates Associated with Four Categories of
Street Stops, 2004-2008
Crime Suspected
Number of stops made
Weapons Seizure Rate
Marijuana Possession
52,018
0.49%
Weapons Possession
442,552
2.37%
Violent Crime
340,792
0.71%
Other Offenses
1,388,786
0.43%
Total
2,224,148
0.86%
Weapons seizure rates based on seizures documented in UF-250 database,
resulting from each type of stop.
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Table 9: Negative Binomial Regression of Weapons Seizures as a Function of Marijuana
Enforcement Activity and Covariates
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Based on
Based on
Based on
marijuana stop
marijuana
Based on
marijuana stops
volume,
stops+arrests,
marijuana stop
and arrests,
population
population
volume, total
total stop
VARIABLES
exposure
exposure
stop exposure
exposure
0.406
0.264
Marijuana Stops (thousand)

[0.332]
Total Marijuana Enforcement
(thousand stops+arrests)
% Non-Hispanic Black
% Hispanic
% Other Race
SES Disadvantage
% Foreign Born
Total Stops (thousands)
Lag Violent Crime
(thousand complaints)
Lag Marijuana Arrests
(thousands)
Constant

0.847
[0.373]
0.723
[0.577]
1.142
[0.717]
0.0721
[0.0994]
-2.072
[0.682]
0.0547
[0.0236]
0.169
[0.257]
-0.308
[0.142]

*

**
*

*

-0.0524
[0.247]
0.911 *
[0.373]
0.727
[0.567]
1.133
[0.696]
0.0704
[0.104]
-1.999 **
[0.677]
0.0648 **
[0.0231]
0.178
[0.273]
-0.285
[0.213]

[0.265]
0.191
[0.226]
0.0167
[0.321]
0.597
[0.366]
-0.101
[0.0544]
-0.187
[0.360]
-0.0572 **
[0.0150]
0.833 **
[0.213]
-0.142
[0.110]
2.371 **
[0.198]

0.104
[0.152]
0.202
[0.227]
0.000263
[0.320]
0.633
[0.372]
-0.0967
[0.0552]
-0.212
[0.359]
-0.0542 **
[0.0128]
0.799 **
[0.216]
-0.215
[0.148]
2.39 **
[0.201]

-7.191 **
-7.23 **
[0.343]
[0.319]
Observations
300
300
300
300
Number of Precincts
75
75
75
75
0.24
0.66
0.66
Pseudo-R2
0.24
Total marijuana enforcement computed as: marijuana stops+marijuana arrests - marijuana arrests in stop
documentation. All models include fixed effects for borough and year.
Models estimated as GEE's with AR(1) covariance within precincts. Standard errors in brackets.
Significance: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Figure 1: Marijuana Possession Arrests, NYC
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Figure 3: New York City Map of Marijuana Possession Stops
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Figure 4: New York City Map, Shading by Tract % Black, Overlaid with Police Precinct Boundaries
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GELLER AND FAGAN
APPENDIX A: NEW YORK STATE PENAL LAW
§221.05-221.30: POSSESSION OF MARIHUANA

§ 221.05 Unlawful possession of marihuana. A person is guilty of unlawful possession of marihuana when he
knowingly and unlawfully possesses marihuana. Unlawful possession of marihuana is a violation punishable only
by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars. However, where the defendant has previously been convicted of an
offense defined in this article or article 220 of this chapter, committed within the three years immediately preceding
such violation, it shall be punishable (a) only by a fine of not more than two hundred dollars, if the defendant was
previously convicted of one such offense committed during such period, and (b) by a fine of not more than two
hundred fifty dollars or a term of imprisonment not in excess of fifteen days or both, if the defendant was previously
convicted of two such offenses committed during such period.
§ 221.10 Criminal possession of marihuana in the fifth degree. A person is guilty of criminal possession of
marihuana in the fifth degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses: 1. marihuana in a public place, as
defined in section 240.00 of this chapter, and such marihuana is burning or open to public view; or 2. one or more
preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances containing marihuana and the preparations, compounds, mixtures
or substances are of an aggregate weight of more than twenty-five grams. Criminal possession of marihuana in the
fifth degree is a class B misdemeanor.
§ 221.15 Criminal possession of marihuana in the fourth degree. A person is guilty of criminal possession of
marihuana in the fourth degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses one or more preparations, compounds,
mixtures or substances containing marihuana and the preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances are of an
aggregate weight of more than two ounces. Criminal possession of marihuana in the fourth degree is a class A
misdemeanor.
§ 221.20 Criminal possession of marihuana in the third degree. A person is guilty of criminal possession of
marihuana in the third degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses one or more preparations, compounds,
mixtures or substances containing marihuana and the preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances are of an
aggregate weight of more than eight ounces. Criminal possession of marihuana in the third degree is a class E
felony.
§ 221.25 Criminal possession of marihuana in the second degree. A person is guilty of criminal possession of
marihuana in the second degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses one or more preparations, compounds,
mixtures or substances containing marihuana and the preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances are of an
aggregate weight of more than sixteen ounces. Criminal possession of marihuana in the second degree is a class D
felony.
§ 221.30 Criminal possession of marihuana in the first degree. A person is guilty of criminal possession of
marihuana in the first degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses one or more preparations, compounds,
mixtures or substances containing marihuana and the preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances are of an
aggregate weight of more than ten pounds. Criminal possession of marihuana in the first degree is a class C felony.
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APPENDIX B: SPECIFIC POLICE CONDUCT PERMITTED UNDER DE BOUR
1. What is a Stop?
Police stop and frisk procedures have been ruled constitutional under specific conditions
articulated in Terry v. Ohio (1968). Under Terry, Fourth Amendment restrictions on
unreasonable searches and seizures allow a police officer to stop a suspect on the street and
search her without probable cause to arrest if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that
the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. For their own
protection, police may perform a quick surface search of the person’s outer clothing for weapons
if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is armed. This reasonable suspicion
must be based on “specific and articulable facts” and not merely upon an officer's hunch.
2. Permissible Behaviors
New York law regulates police conduct more thoroughly than does Terry. New York law
articulates a four-step analysis articulated in People v. De Bour (1976) and People v. Holmes
(1996). Stops are governed by N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50(1) (2007):
In addition to the authority provided by this article for making an arrest without a
warrant, a police officer may stop a person in a public place located within the
geographical area of such officer’s employment when he reasonably suspects that
such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony
or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name,
address and an explanation of his conduct.
“Stops” and “frisks” are considered separately under New York statutes. A police officer
may stop a suspect but not be permitted to frisk the suspect given the circumstances. Frisks and
searches are governed by N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50(3), which requires a legitimate “stop”
as a predicate to any frisk.27 In many cases, reasonable suspicion that a person is engaging in
violent or dangerous crime (such as murder, burglary, assault, etc.) will justify both a stop and a
frisk. Table B.1 shows the circumstances that are necessary for a stop to escalate to a frisk and
ultimately to an arrest. Table B.2 shows the specific police actions that are permitted at each
level of a Terry/De Bour stop in New York.

27

“When upon stopping a person under circumstances prescribed in subdivisions one and two a police officer or
court officer, as the case may be, reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury, he may search such
person for a deadly weapon or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing serious physical injury
and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons. If he finds such a weapon or instrument,
or any other property possession of which he reasonably believes may constitute the commission of a crime, he may
take it and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully
possessed, or arrest such person.” N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50(3)
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Table B1. De Bour’s Four Levels of Street Encountersa
Predicate

Permissible Response

Level 1

Objective Credible Reason Approach to Request Information

Level 2

Founded Suspicion - Common Law Right of Inquiry

Level 3

Reasonable Suspicion Stop and (if fear of weapon) Frisk

Level 4

Probable Cause Arrest and Full Search Incident

a. People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y. 2d 210 (1976)

POT AS PRETEXT

February 2010

Table B2. Permissble Actions by Police Officers during Stops
Predicate

Permissible Response

Level 1

P.O. can ask non-threatening questions regarding name, address,
destination and, if person carrying something unusual, police officer can
ask about that. Encounter should be brief and non-threatening. There
should be an absence of harassment and intimidation.
PO can:
 say “STOP” (If not “forceful”)
 approach a stopped car
 touch holster.
PO cannot:



Level 2

request permission to search
cause people to reasonably believe they’re suspected of crime, no
matter how calm and polite the tone of the questions
PO can ask pointed questions that would reasonably lead one to believe
that he/she is suspected of a crime. Questions can be more extended and
accusatory. Focus on possible criminality.
PO can:
 request permission to search
PO cannot:

Level 3

 pursue
 forcibly detain
PO can:

Level 4

 forcibly detain
 frisk for weapons if in fear
 pull car out of traffic flow
 order defendant to lie on the ground
 handcuff (for good reason)
 pursue
PO can arrest and search suspect
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APPENDIX C. REPLICATION OF THE NYPD’S UF-250 FORM
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APPENDIX D: STOP RATIONALES AND ADDITIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES LISTED ON UF-250
Stop Rationales

Additional Circumstances

Carrying suspicious object

Report by victim/witness/officer

Fits a relevant description

Ongoing investigation

Casing a victim or location

Proximity to scene of offense

Acting as a lookout

Evasive response to questioning

Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime

Associating with known criminals

Actions indicative of a drug transaction

Change direction at sight of officer

Furtive movements

Area has high crime incidence

Actions of engaging in a violent crime

Time of day fits crime incident

Suspicious bulge

Sights or sounds of criminal activity

Other

Other

